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Introduction
In 1972 the UK government ‡oated the pound while pursuing highly expansionary …scal policies whose aim was to reduce rising unemployment. To control in ‡ation the government introduced statutory wage and price controls. Monetary policy was given no targets for either the money supply or in ‡ation; interest rates were held at rates that would accommodate growth and falling unemployment. Since wage and price controls would inevitably break down faced with the in ‡ationary e¤ects of such policies, this period appears to …t rather well with the policy requirements of the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level: …scal
We are grateful to Jagjit Chadha, Juergen von Hagen, Eric Leeper and economics seminar participants in Cardi¤, Kent and Plymouth universities, for useful comments on an earlier version. We are of course responsible for any remaining errors. policy appears to have been non-Ricardian (not limited by concerns with solvency) and monetary policy accommodative to in ‡ation -in the language of Leeper (1991) …scal policy was 'active' and monetary policy was 'passive'. Furthermore, there was no reason to believe that this policy regime would come to an end: both Conservative and Labour parties won elections in the 1970s and both pursued essentially the same policies. While Margaret Thatcher won the Conservative leadership in 1975 and also the election in 1979, during the period we study here it was not assumed that the monetarist policies she advocated would ever occur, since they were opposed by the two other parties, by a powerful group in her own party, as well as by the senior civil service. Only after her election and her actual implementation of them was this a reasonable assumption. So it appears that in the period from 1972 to 1979 there was a prevailing policy regime which was expected to continue. These are key assumptions about the policy environment; besides this narrative background we also check them empirically below. Besides investigating behaviour in the 1970s, we go on to investigate the behaviour of the Thatcher regime in the 1980s, to test the popular assumption that this regime greatly changed the conduct of macro-economic policy. According to this assumption there was a shift of regime towards 'monetarist' policy, in which monetary policy became 'active'and …scal policy became 'passive'(or 'Ricardian'). Thus we broaden our analysis to put the 1970s episode into the context of the evolution of macroeconomic policy over this whole dramatic period of UK history.
Under FTPL the price level or in ‡ation is determined by the need to impose …scal solvency; thus it is set so that the market value of outstanding debt equals the expected present value of future primary surpluses. The FTPL has been set out and developed in Leeper (1991) , Sims (1994 Sims ( , 1997 , Woodford (1996 Woodford ( , 1998 Woodford ( , 2001 ) and Cochrane (2001 Cochrane ( , 2005 ) -see also comments by McCallum (2001 McCallum ( , 2003 and Buiter (1999 Buiter ( , 2002 , and for surveys Kocherlakota and Phelan (1999) , Carlstrom and Fuerst (2000) and Christiano and Fitzgerald (2000) . Empirical tests have been proposed by Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2001) and Bohn (1998) . Loyo (2000) for example argues that Brazilian policy in the late 1970s and early 1980s was non-Ricardian and that the FTPL provides a persuasive explanation for Brazil's high in ‡ation during that time. The work of Tanner and Ramos (2003) also …nds evidence of …scal dominance for the case of Brazil for some important periods. Cochrane (1999 Cochrane ( , 2005 argues that the FTPL with a statistically exogenous surplus process explains the dynamics of U.S. in ‡ation in the 1970s. This appears to be similar to what we see in the UK during the 1970s.
Our aim in this paper is to test the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level (FTPL) as applied to the UK in the 1970s episode we described above; and to contrast it with the apparently very di¤erent policy in the 1980s. Cochrane (1999 Cochrane ( , 2001 Cochrane ( , and 2005 has noted that there is a basic identi…cation problem a¤ecting the FTPL: in the FTPL …scal policy is exogenous and forces in ‡ation to produce …scal solvency. But similar economic behaviour can be consistent with an exogenous monetary policy determining in ‡ation in the 'orthodox' way, with Ricardian …scal policy endogenously responding to the government budget constraint to ensure solvency given that in ‡ation path -what we will call the Orthodox model. Thus there is a besetting problem in the empirical literature we have cited above, that equations that appear to re ‡ect the FTPL and are used to 'test'it, could also be implied by the Orthodox set-up. To put it more formally the reduced form or solved representation of an FTPL model may in form be indistinguishable from that of an orthodox model; this is true of both single-equation implications of the model and complete solutions of it.
We meet this problem head on in this paper by setting up speci…c versions of both these two models and testing each against the data. We …rst establish that, even though these two models may produce similar reduced forms, they are identi…able by the detailed di¤erences within these reduced forms and cannot therefore be confused wth each other. Secondly, we follow a comprehensive testing procedure;
we use Bayesian estimation, and rank the two models using various priors. We …nd that we cannot unambiguously rank these models regardless of the priors we use; also because the data likelihood is rather ‡at, we cannot even rank them convincingly using ‡at priors. The widely-used Likelihood Ratio test is thus quite weak in this context and cannot establish a ranking. Our principal test is to examine the models'ability to reproduce the data behaviour, which can be represented by impulse response functions or moments and cross-moments but which we represent parsimoniously here by the features of a VECM; this is the little-known method of 'indirect inference', whose power is rather high as a test.
Our paper is organised as follows. We review the history of UK policy during the 1970s in section 2; in this section we establish a narrative that suggests the FTPL could have been at work. In section 3 we set up a particular model of FTPL that we argue could be a candidate to explain this UK episode; side by side with it we set out a particular rival 'Orthodox'model in which monetary policy is governed by a Taylor Rule and …scal policy is Ricardian. In section 4 we discuss the data and the results of our testing procedure. In section 5 we compare our results with those for the 1980s. Section 6 concludes.
The nature of UK policy during the 1970s
From WWII until its breakdown in 1970 the Bretton Woods system governed the UK exchange rate and hence its monetary policy. While exchange controls gave some moderate freedom to manage interest rates away from foreign rates without the policy being overwhelmed by capital movements, such freedom was mainly only for the short term; the setting of interest rates was dominated in the longer term by the need to control the balance of payments su¢ ciently to hold the sterling exchange rate. Pegging the exchange rate implied that the price level was also pegged to the foreign price level. Through this mechanism monetary policy ensured price level determinacy. Fiscal policy was therefore disciplined by the inability to shift the price level from this trajectory and also by the consequent …xing of the home interest rate to the foreign level. While this discipline could in principle be overthrown by …scal policy forcing a series of devaluations, the evidence suggests that this did not happen; there were just two devaluations during the whole post-war period up to 1970, in 1949 and 1967. On both occasions a Labour government viewed the devaluation as a one-o¤ change permitting a brief period of monetary and …scal ease, to be followed by a return to the previous regime.
However, after the collapse of Bretton Woods, the UK moved in a series of steps to a ‡oating exchange rate. Initially sterling was …xed to continental currencies through a European exchange rate system known as 'the snake in the tunnel', designed to hold rates within a general range (the tunnel) and if possible even closer (the snake). Sterling proved di¢ cult to keep within these ranges, and was in practice kept within a range against the dollar at an 'e¤ective'(currency basket) rate. interest rates kept low to encourage falling unemployment. In 1976 the Labour government invited the IMF to stabilise the falling sterling exchange rate; the IMF terms included the setting of targets for Domestic Credit Expansion. These were largely met by a form of control on deposits (the 'corset') which forced banks to reduce deposits in favour of other forms of liability. But by 1978 these restraints had e¤ectively been abandoned and prices and incomes controls reinstated in the context of a pre-election …scal and monetary expansion -see Minford (1993) , Nelson (2003) and Meenagh et al. (2009b) for further discussions of the UK policy environment for this and other post-war UK periods.
Our description of policy suggests that the role of the nominal anchor for in ‡ation may have been played during the 1970s by …scal policy, if only because monetary policy was not given this task and was purely accommodative. Thus this episode appears on the face of it to be a good candidate for FTPL to apply.
An FTPL Model for the UK in the 1970s
In what follows we set out a simple particular model of the FTPL that captures key aspects of UK behaviour. We assume that the UK …nances its de…cit by issuing nominal perpetuities, each paying one pound per period and whose present value is therefore 1 Rt where R t is the long-term rate of interest. We use perpetuities here rather than the usual one-period bond because of the preponderance of long-term bonds in the UK debt issue: the average maturity of UK debt at this time was approximately ten years but a model with a realistic maturity structure would lose tractability. All bonds at this time were nominal (indexed bonds were not issued until 1981).
The government budget constraint can then be written as:
where G t is government spending in money terms, T t is government taxation in money terms, B t is the number of perpetuities issued. Note that when perpetuities are assumed the debt interest in period t is B t while the stock of debt at the start of period t has the value during the period of Bt Rt ; end-period debt therefore has the value Bt+1 Rt : Note too the perpetuity interest rate is by construction expected to remain constant into the future.
We can derive the implied value of current bonds outstanding by substituting forwards for future bonds outstanding:
We represent this equation in terms of each period's expected 'permanent' tax and spending share, t t and g t , and assume that E t T t+i = t t E t P t+i y t+i and E t G t+i = g t E t P t+i y t+i : Thus these two shares summarise the key …scal settings, in the same way that a consumer's permanent income replaces the consumer's complex income prospects with a constant stream of income with the same present value.
It is a feature of such permanent variables (a class to which the perpetuity interest rate also belongs since it is the expected average of all future one-period interest rates) that they follow a random walk- Hall (1978) . We will exploit this feature in what follows, both to develop this model's behaviour and to distinguish this model from the Orthodox model. We can then simplify (2) (see Appendix) to:
where R t = r t + t (respectively the perpetuity real interest rate and perpetuity in ‡ation rate, both 'permanent'variables), is the growth rate of equilibrium real GDP , y t (which is a random walk with this as its drift term). All these expected permanent variables are by construction expected to be constant in the future at today's level.
The pricing condition on bonds in equation (3) thus sets their value consistently with expected future primary surpluses. Suppose now the government reduces the present value of future primary surpluses.
At an unchanged real value of the debt this would be a 'non-Ricardian'…scal policy move. According to the FTPL prices will adjust to reduce the real value of the debt to ensure that the solvency condition is met. This is to be compared with the normal Ricardian situation, in which …scal surpluses are endogenous so that …scal shocks today lead to adjustments in future surpluses, the price level remaining una¤ected.
Since the pricing equation sets the ratio of debt value to GDP equal to a function of permanent variables, it follows that this ratio b t follows a random walk 1 such that:
This in turn allows us to solve for the in ‡ation shock as a function of other shocks (especially shocks to government tax and spending). With the number of government bonds issued, B t ;being pre-determined (issued last period) and therefore known at t 1, equation (3) could be written as follows (taking logs and letting log x ue t = log x t E t 1 log x t , the unexpected change in log x t ) (6) (8) to obtain: (9) t = (g t t t ) + c + r t + log y t Tax and spending ratios are assumed to deviate temporarily from their permanent values according to error processes (which must be stationary by construction). Thus: (10) (g t t t ) = (g t t t ) + t : Since by construction a permanent variable follows a random walk, this gives us:
where err g t t is a stationary error process. We may now note that there is some unknown error process by which actual in ‡ation is related to permanent in ‡ation: thus t = t + t : We use (9) for the determinants of t and since we cannot observe ( r t + log y t ) we include this in the total error process, err pi t , so that …nally our FTPL model for in ‡ation is:
We can now complete the DSGE model by adding a forward-looking IS curve, derived in the usual way from the household Euler equation and the goods market-clearing condition, and a New Keynesian Phillips Curve 2 :
Note that the interest rate in the IS curve, R s t , is the usual short term rate. Also we can see that since (12) sets in ‡ation, (14) will solve for output and (13) will solve for interest rates. Equilibrium output, y t , approximated in the FTPL derivation as a random walk, is represented empirically by the H-P trend in output and estimated as an I(1) process:
The permanent real interest rate is absorbed into the error term of the IS curve, as it was into that of (12) for in ‡ation.
Our candidate FTPL model thus consists of equations (11)- (15), with all equation errors assumed to follow an AR(1) process. Notice that while the central bank can be thought of as 'setting'the short-term interest rate, it must do consistently with (13); it is in this sense that 'monetary policy'is endogenous. 
An Orthodox model:
To construct a particular Orthodox model we jettison equations (11) and (12) above in favour of a Taylor
Rule to set R s t and a Ricardian …scal equation that restores the de…cit to some equilibrium level. Thus in place of these we have:
Notice that this last equation implies that the primary …scal surplus is stationary; this in turn implies that its permanent value does not move (since if it did it would make the surplus non-stationary). We there is price ‡exibility. It turns out that it makes virtually no di¤erence -results available on request. This can be seen if one solves for output from (14) ; the only di¤erence to the solution will come from having ( t E t 1 t) on the RHS instead of ( t Et t+1 ). These expressions are very similar in practice.
are to think of temporary variations in the surplus that do not alter long-run …scal prospects. Thus in this model monetary policy sets in ‡ation via a Taylor Rule and we assume that the …scal surplus is set to ensure …scal solvency given in ‡ation, output and interest rates.
Model identi…cation
It would be reasonable to ask whether a macroeconomic model of a few equations like the ones here can be considered to be identi…ed. Le et al. (2013) examined this issue for a three-equation New Keynesian model of the sort being considered here. They found that it was likely to be heavily over-identi…ed.
Thus there were many more coe¢ cients in the reduced form than in the structural model; under normal assumptions this should give several sets of estimates of the structural coe¢ cients from the reduced form.
With enough data these sets would coincide and so even a partial reduced form should be su¢ cient to yield a set of structural parameter estimates. In that paper they went further and sought to …nd alternative structural parameter sets that could generate the same reduced form; using indirect inference they were able to establish that no other sets could exist. These results suggest that we can regard each of the two models here as over-identi…ed, implying that there is no chance of confusing the reduced form of the one with the reduced form of the other.
We can check the identi…cation of our two models using exactly the same method. We carry out a
Monte Carlo experiment in which we assume that the FTPL model is true (we give it the parameters similar to those we later estimate for it) and using the FTPL error properties we generate 1,000 samples of data from it (of the same length as in our 1970s sample here -28 quarters) and calculate the VECM approximate reduced form from it. We now ask whether any Orthodox model could generate the same data and hence the same VECM reduced form, using the indirect inference test at 95% con…dence; if indeed it could do so, thus e¤ectively being the same model, then we would reject exactly the same percent of the time as we reject the true FTPL model -namely 5%. In fact we reject it for 51% of the samples; thus it cannot be the same model (table 1. We also did the reverse, and found the same, rejecting about 20% of the time). In doing this check we have searched over a wide range of parameter values using the Simulated Annealing algorithm, starting from the estimated parameters. This test shows clearly that these two models cannot be confused with each other under conditions where data availability is not a problem -i.e., under the asymptotic conditions we assume for identi…cation.
Thus they are not 'observationally equivalent'. This does not contradict the general problem we noted at the start that the two models have similar reduced forms. In particular we show below that their data representations in VECM form are similar. To distinguish them one needs to estimate and test them in full, which we now go on to do.
Data and Test Results for the 1970s
We limit our focus to the period between 1972-1979 during which the FTPL could be a potential candidate given the economic background. We use un…ltered (but seasonally adjusted) data from o¢ cial sources.
We de…ne as R s t the Minimum Lending Rates, and as t the percentage change in the CPI index, both in quarterly term. We use for y t the real GDP level in natural logorithm and for y t its trend values as suggested by the H-P …lter. The primary de…cit ratio g t is simply the di¤erence between G=GDP and T =GDP , where G and T are respectively the levels of government spending and tax income. In particular, since for model convergence the amount of government spending is required to be less than taxation for government bonds to have a positive value, and that government spending on a capital variety is expected to produce future returns in line with real interest rates, we deduct the trend in such spending from the trend in G=GDP . By implementing this we assume that the average share of expenditure devoted to …xed capital, health and education in the period can be regarded as the (constant) trend in such capital spending; of course the 'capital' element in total government spending is unobservable and hence our assumption is intended merely to adjust the level of g in an approximate way but not its movement over time which we regard as accurately capturing changes in such spending. This adjustment counts for about 10% of GDP. Note that the primary de…cit is therefore negative (i.e. there is a primary surplus throughout). Figure 1 plots the time series.
The method of Indirect Inference
We begin our analysis with the Indirect Inference (II) method we found gave us the most convincing results; we introduce Bayesian and other analysis after …rst presenting the II results. The II method used here is that originally proposed in Meenagh et al. (2009a) and subsequently re…ned by Le et al.
(2011) using Monte Carlo experiments. The approach employs an auxiliary model that is completely independent of the theoretical one to produce a description of the data against which the performance of the theory is evaluated indirectly. Such a description can be summarised either by the estimated parameters of the auxiliary model or by functions of these; we will call these the descriptors of the data.
While these are treated as the 'reality', the theoretical model being evaluated is simulated to …nd its implied values for them. The auxiliary model should be a process that would describe the evolution of the data under any relevant model. It is known that for non-stationary data the reduced form of a macro model is a VARMA where non-stationary forcing variables enter as conditioning variables to achieve cointegration (i.e. ensuring that the stochastic trends in the endogenous vector are picked up so that the errors in the VAR are stationary). This in turn can be approximated as a VECM 4 . So following Meenagh et al. (2012) procedure (e¤ectively indirect estimation) has converged on the best model parameters, we then move to generating the expectations exactly implied by the parameters and the data, and use these to calculate the errors, which are then the exact errors implied by the model and data. The reason we do not use this 'exact'method at the start is that initially when the model is far from the data, the expectations generated are also far from the true ones, so that the errors are exaggerated and the procedure may not converge. 4 Following Meenagh et al. (2012), we can say that after log-linearisation a DSGE model can usually be written in the form
where yt are p endogenous variables and xt are q exogenous variables which we assume are driven by
The exogenous variables may contain both observable and unobservable variables such as a technology shock. The disturbances et and t are both iid variables with zero means. It follows that both yt and xt are non-stationary. L denotes the lag operator z t s = L s zt and A(L), B(L) etc. are polynomial functions with roots outside the unit circle.
where the polynomial functions have roots outside the unit circle. As yt and xt are non-stationary, the solution has the p cointegration relations
The long-run solution to the model is
Hence the long-run solution to xt, namely, xt = x D t + x S t has a deterministic trend
Hence, in general, the disturbance !t is a mixed moving average process. This suggests that the VECM can be approximated by the VARX yt = K(y t 1
where t is an iid zero-mean process. As
the VECM can also be written as
Either equations (A6) or (A7) can act as the auxiliary model. Here we focus on (A7); this distinguishes between the e¤ect of the trend element in x and the temporary deviation from its trend. In our models these two elements have di¤erent we use as the auxiliary model a VECM which we reexpress as a VARX(1) for the four macro variables (interest rate, output, in ‡ation and the primary budget de…cit, with a time trend and with y t entered as the exogenous non-stationary 'productivity trend'(these two elements having the e¤ect of achieving cointegration). Thus our auxiliary model in practice is given by: y t = [I K]y t 1 + x t 1 + gt + v t where x t 1 is the stochastic trend in productivity, gt are the deterministic trends, and v t are the VECM innovations. We treat as the descriptors of the data all the VARX coe¢ cients and the VARX error variances.
From these a Wald statistic may be computed that acts as a test at a given con…dence level of whether the observed dynamics, volatility and cointegrating relations of the chosen variables are explained by the DSGE-model-simulated joint distribution of these. This Wald statistic is given by:
where is the vector of VARX estimates of the chosen descriptors yielded in each simulation, with and P ( ) representing the corresponding sample means and variance-covariance matrix of these calculated across simulations, respectively.
The joint distribution of the is obtained by bootstrapping the innovations implied by the data and the theoretical model; it is therefore an estimate of the small sample distribution 5 . Such a distribution is generally more accurate for small samples than the asymptotic distribution; it is also shown to be consistent by Le et al. (2011) given that the Wald statistic is 'asymptotically pivotal'; they also showed it had quite good accuracy in small sample Monte Carlo experiments 6 .
This testing procedure is applied to a set of (structural) parameters put forward as the true ones (H 0 , the null hypothesis); they can be derived from calibration, estimation, or both. However derived, the test then asks: could these coe¢ cients within this model structure be the true (numerical) model Monte Carlo experiments to check this procedure and …nd it to be extremely accurate. 5 The bootstraps in our tests are all drawn as time vectors so contemporaneous correlations between the innovations are preserved. 6 Speci…cally, they found on stationary data that the bias due to bootstrapping was just over 2% at the 95% con…dence level and 0.6% at the 99% level. Meenagh Thus we calculate the minimum-value full Wald statistic for each model using a powerful algorithm based on Simulated Annealing (SA) in which search takes place over a wide range around the initial values, with optimising search accompanied by random jumps around the space 7 . The merit of this extended procedure is that we are comparing the best possible versions of each model type when …nally doing our comparison of model compatibility with the data.
Model results under II
We now turn to the empirical performance of the competing models outlined above under II. We summarise the model estimates (by Simulated Annealing) in The estimates for the two models'shared parameters ( and ) are strikingly di¤erent. In the FTPL is high and is low, implying a steep Phillips curve and a ‡at IS curve. Since in ‡ation is determined exogenously by the exogenous de…cit ratio and its own error process, the steep Phillips curve (which determines the output gap) implies that the output gap responds weakly to in ‡ation while the ‡at IS curve (which sets interest rates) implies that the real interest rate responds weakly to the output gap. 7 We use a Simulated Annealing algorithm due to Ingber (1996) . This mimics the behaviour of the steel cooling process in which steel is cooled, with a degree of reheating at randomly chosen moments in the cooling process-this ensuring that the defects are minimised globally. Similarly the algorithm searches in the chosen range and as points that improve the objective are found it also accepts points that do not improve the objective. This helps to stop the algorithm being caught in local minima. We …nd this algorithm improves substantially here on a standard optimisation algorithm. Our method used our standard testing method: we take a set of model parameters (excluding error processes), extract the resulting residuals from the data using the LIML method, …nd their implied autoregressive coe¢ cients (AR(1) here) and then bootstrap the implied innovations with this full set of parameters to …nd the implied Wald value. This is then minimised by the SA algorithm.
The impulse response functions for the FTPL model (…gures 2-5) con…rm this 8 . E¤ectively this suppresses most of the simultaneity in the model as can be seen from the variance decomposition in table 3. We …nd this by bootstrapping the innovations of the model repeatedly for the same sample episode -plainly the variances of non-stationary variables, while unde…ned asymptotically, are de…ned for this (short) sample period. One sees that in ‡ation is disturbed by both the …scal de…cit and its own shock; output by both the productivity trend and the supply (err P P ) shock, with a minimal e¤ect from the in ‡ation shock; real interest rates entirely by its own (err IS ) shock; nominal interest rates respond to a mixture of shocks because they combine in ‡ation and real interest rates. On the other hand, the estimates for the Orthodox model imply a standard Phillips Curve and also a fairly ‡at IS curve. The Taylor Rule has fairly standard New Keynesian responses to in ‡ation (1.3) and the output gap (0.06), implying a ‡at response of interest rates to output gap movement. There is also a weak Ricardian …scal plan, with the de…cit converging extremely slowly ( = 0:007). In this model the macro-economy is orthogonal to the …scal de…cit but there is considerable simultaneity otherwise. Shocks to demand (IS), supply (P P ) and monetary policy (R S ) each move all four macro variables in a relatively normal way, as can be seen from the impulse responses 9 (…gures 6-9) and also the variance decomposition Taylor Rule interest rate responses to limit in ‡ation variation; these shocks dominate in ‡ation variance which triggers the Taylor Rule response limiting the e¤ects on real interest rates and output. Demand (err IS ) shocks trigger in ‡ation and Taylor Rule responses, so largely a¤ecting interest rate variance.
Supply (err P P ) shocks trigger sharp in ‡ation responses which are largely neutralised by real interest rate responses; these in turn destabilise output, given the ‡at IS curve. One thing the table immediately con…rms is that both models have VARX representations that are formally similar to each other's and also in general in most cases embrace the actual data coe¢ cients.
This illustrates the formal similarity of the two models in terms of their data representation, already noted in our discussion of the identi…cation problem: there is no a priori qualitative or numerical restriction we can apply to any VARX coe¢ cient(s) that would re ‡ect one model and not the other. Instead we rely on the joint distribution of all these VARX coe¢ cients to di¤er in numerical detail across the two models, as we know they do from our identi…cation discussion above: we then ask via the Wald test whether the joint distribution of each model could contain the joint values found on the data. These tests are shown in table 6. They show the percentile of the Wald distribution where the data-based VARX lies (the 'Wald percentile') and also the p-value (=[100 minus this percentile]/100).
The table suggests that when the models are asked to …t all elements of the VARX, both models pass the Wald test at 95% con…dence level. Both models deal very well with volatility. On trend and dynamics, the Orthodox passes comfortably while the FTPL is on the margin of rejection. It is in fact hard to establish much of a di¤erence between the two models; though the p-value of the Orthodox model on the all-elements test is about double that on the FTPL, this is not a wide margin. Both models in e¤ect marginally fail to be rejected overall.
However, we know that it is impossible for both models to be true, having checked that they are identi…ed. Thus this interesting result could mean that one of the two models is true but the other one, though false, cannot be rejected because there is insu¢ cient power with the small sample here; or it could mean that both models are false and a third model that lies somewhere between the two is true.
In this case both models could have enough elements of truth in them not to be rejected. This would suggest that some combination of the two, combining these elements, could be closer to the true model than either alone.
This was, as should have been clear from our earlier discussion of the context, a period of great uncertainty in UK economics and politics; in 1975 there was even a proposal by certain Labour politicians led by Tony Benn, a leading minister in the government, to install a siege economy (e¤ectively to insulate an FTPL strategy from external pressures), and this was only narrowly defeated within the Labour government. It may therefore well be that people gave some probability to an FTPL regime continuing and some to an orthodox regime reasserting itself -in the manner described by Leeper (1991) . We return to this issue after reviewing the empirical results obtained by Bayesian methods.
Bayesian analysis of the two models
Bayesian estimation methods have become widespread in macro-modelling and so it is appropriate that we ask what contribution they can make to our investigation here. There are two main approaches we can take: with strong priors and with ‡at or uninformative priors. In the latter case the Bayesian method becomes FIML and we can use the Likelihood Ratio in the usual classical manner. In the former the model posterior likelihood and hence ranking involves both the priors and the data likelihood. We report the two approaches in turn. As is plain from the listing in table 7, for strong priors (that are chosen to be in favor of either the FTPL model or the Orthodox model) the marginal data likelihoods are extremely di¤erent from the viewpoint of ranking the two models based on the Bayes factor. In this case we are able to obtain a strong ranking of the models on each set of priors; but the rankings contradict each other, with the priors e¤ectively setting the rank order. Plainly we cannot use these estimates to rank the models without begging the question of which model and associated priors is correct.
If we turn to the FIML estimates where the priors are ‡at and so irrelevant, we encounter the besetting problem of ‡at likelihood in small samples. We obtain model estimates that are quite di¤erent from the II estimates as we show in table (8) . Yet when we compute the Likelihood Ratio of these estimates (against the VARX on the data) we …nd that both models fail to be rejected by the data on their ML estimates (the Orthodox is on the margin) and furthermore on their II estimates they get even closer to the data, suggesting that the ML estimator has great di¢ culty in locating the optimal parameter values. The II estimator has much lower small sample bias (Le et al, 2014 ) and locates parameter values that get the models closer to the data on both the LR and II tests. While the FTPL model has higher likelihood than the Orthodox on the ML estimates, it has lower likelihood than the Orthodox on the II estimates.
Our conclusion from these various methods of evaluation is that we cannot rank the models using strong priors because we obtain contradictory results depending on which priors we use. We may use ML estimation ( ‡at priors) and the LR test but this like the II test fails to reject either model. Yet as we have already argued they cannot both simultaneously be the true model and so we proceed to estimate and test a combined model. We use II in what follows because as we have seen it avoids the di¢ culties created by strong priors and, given ‡at or no priors, it performs better than ML and the associated LR test, because it both has a lower small sample bias than ML as an estimator and has greater power than LR as a test procedure.
Results for a combined model
Our II results for the two models above suggest that in ‡ation behaviour was being in ‡uenced by expectations of two potential regimes each with a certain probability. In ‡ation in this model equals expected in ‡ation because no information lag is assumed. Hence we can think of the FTPL in ‡ation equation as showing the in ‡ation that would be expected (and would also occur) at time t if the FTPL regime was in operation. Similarly for the Orthodox model we can think of the Taylor Rule equation as de…ning the in ‡ation that would be permitted by the rule (and so would also occur) at prevailing interest rates; thus this would be the in ‡ation expected if the Orthodox regime was prevailing. We can therefore create a model in which in ‡ation expectations are governed by the probability-weighted in ‡ation rate under the two regimes; this will be also the actual in ‡ation, since actual = expected. In this model in ‡ation will thus be a weighted combination of the two models'in ‡ation equations -the FTPL and the Taylor Rule equations:
Given that in ‡ation is determined by the probability-weighted average of each regime's own in ‡ation outcome, we now have a composite in ‡ation error -which in principle consists of the weighted combination of the two regime error processes plus any temporary deviations of in ‡ation from this weighted combination (e.g. due to variation in the weight). Since we cannot observe what the in ‡ation rate actually was in each regime, only the average outcome, we can only observe a composite error.
All the other equations are the same, with the exception of the …scal de…cit equation which has an AR coe¢ cient ( = 0:007, as reported in table 2) that is so close to zero that it cannot resolve the uncertainty about which regime is operating; we allow it to be determined by the model estimation.
When we examine the results of this weighted model (as we report in tables 9 and 10 in comparison to the earlier results), we see that it improves on both models alone, giving a weight on FTPL of 0.58.
The improvement comes in …tting the trend and dynamics, as all the models have little di¢ culty …tting the volatility in the data. The model now adopts a very ‡at Phillips Curve, a steep IS Curve, and a tough Taylor Rule (with a high response to in ‡ation and a moderate response to the output gap). The e¤ect of the FTPL de…cit mechanism (now W eight) is a third higher than in the FTPL model. Note The resulting variance decomposition (table 11) gives the supply shock and the weighted in ‡ation shocks about an equal role in output variability -the latter including as we have seen both the monetary policy and any exogenous in ‡ation shock. These two shocks also share the main role in real interest rate variability. For in ‡ation variability the …scal shock becomes dominant, with the supply shock providing the rest. Nominal interest rate variability thus re ‡ects a roughly similar role for supply, in ‡ation and …scal shocks. What we see here in the weighted model is that the FTPL in ‡uences remain important. In the next section we review the implications of this successful weighted model for the causes of what happened quarter by quarter. Clearly, huge errors in policy were made, to permit the large rise in in ‡ation and the prolonged recession both to occur during the mid-1970s. In our …nal concluding section, we re ‡ect on the policy lessons and how they were absorbed subsequently in UK political choices. In the timeline for output (…gure 15) we see that all these shocks play a part; the dominant role, as foreshadowed by our variance decomposition, is taken by the supply and in ‡ation shocks but these essentially cancel each other out, leaving the IS shock as the factor creating recession and the productivity shock assisting it in generating later recovery. For in ‡ation (…gure 16) the …scal shock is the key factor generating the sharp in ‡ation explosion from 1973-5, aided by the supply shock. For interest rates (…gure 17), …scal, supply and in ‡ation shocks all three are major factors, but tend to cancel each other out, so that interest rates move less than one might expect given the sharp rise in in ‡ation in mid-1975; this is Thus the overall picture of the period from our weighted model is that the …scal de…cit was a key factor in driving in ‡ation expectations and that monetary policy in practice did little to moderate these; interest rates varied inadequately. Output was the victim of poor productivity growth and the demand shocks of the mid-1970s, with these both improving somewhat later in the period.
From these timelines it is clear that poor expected macro policy choices, both …scal and monetary, reinforced the bad results already created by the poor growth of productivity. The two factors together produced economic results so bad that the British voters backed Margaret Thatcher's radical policy changes over a whole decade, embracing not merely macro-policy but also supply-side policy reforms.
Whether the voters would have backed her had the economy not been in such a parlous condition in 1979 is a matter of intense interest for political economy but clearly lies well outside the scope of this paper.
We now turn to a comparative analysis of the 1980s episode in which the Thatcher government changed the macro-economic policy regime. According to most accounts this sets up an 'active'monetary policy designed to bear down on in ‡ation and a 'passive'or Ricardian …scal policy designed to ensure solvency;
another way of expressing this used in commentary at the time (e.g. Minford, 1980; Sargent and Wallace, 1981 ) was that …scal policy should not threaten monetary policy by undermining con…dence in solvency.
If these widely-accepted accounts are correct, we should …nd according to our empirical II method that the 1980s data give opposite results to the1970s. We should …nd that the FTPL model performs less well and that its weight in any weighted model is much smaller while the e¤ect of …scal behaviour on in ‡ation should also be small. . 495 .907 .651
Analysis of the 1980s
All elements (VARX coe¤.+resid.)
. 11 .213 .328
Note: p-value = (100-Wald percentile)/100. Tables 12 to 14 show the results for the 1980s (the data is from 1979 to 1990). Once again, we …nd that the weighted model dominates the two models singly by a large factor. Furthermore as in the 1970s both the FTPL and the Orthodox models fail to be rejected by the data; and the Orthodox performs again only somewhat better than the FTPL. We can conclude from this that in spite of the new government's announced intentions uncertainty remained about the two regimes and whether speci…cally …scal policy would remain under control. The weight on the FTPL regime remained as high as 44%.
Thus it might appear that the 1980s were not so di¤erent as widely thought from the 1970s. Nevertheless, the e¤ect of the …scal de…cit on the economy fades from the picture in the weighted model. Its direct e¤ect on in ‡ation ( W eight) falls from 0.47 in the 1970s to 0.14 in the 1980s. In the variance decomposition its role in in ‡uencing the economy's behaviour virtually disappears, its share of in ‡ation variance falling to 2.3% and of nominal interest rate variance to 0.2%. We can interpret this as implying that although people were worried that …scal policy might matter for in ‡ation resurgence and hence assigned it a role, in practice its behaviour was tighly controlled so that these fears were not realised. At the same time the 'monetarist'tag attached to the new government is borne out by the high monetary response to in ‡ation (this being [1 W eight] = 2:03).
Interestingly, this interpretation is reinforced by the well-known nervousness about …scal de…cits of the Thatcher government, famously exhibited in the controversially tight 1981 budget. In e¤ect the Thatcher ministers were deeply concerned to lay to rest doubts about their …scal policy intentions so that their perceived monetary toughness towards in ‡ation would not be undermined.
Conclusions
In this paper we have examined an episode of UK history, the 1970s, when …scal policy may have been set without thought for future solvency implications and monetary policy may have been entirely accommodative -a case of the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level (FTPL). Because the data implications of this theory are qualitatively similar to those of the Orthodox theory in which monetary policy is set by a Taylor Rule to hit an in ‡ation target and …scal policy is set to achieve solvency at that in ‡ation rate, we have set up the two theories as rival structural models and tested each against the behaviour found in the data, by the method of Indirect Inference (our e¤orts to use Bayesian or Maximum Likelihood estimation could not distinguish convincingly between the two models). Our …nding is that neither model is rejected by the data and that the Orthodox model can account better for the data behaviour than the FTPL; but also that the best account of the period assumes that expectations were a probability-weighted combination of the two regimes. The policies pursued in this episode generated generally high as well as volatile in ‡ation, together with weak productivity growth and a long-lived recession. They paved the way for a decisive change of approach to both …scal and monetary policy after the election of 1979. However we also found when examining the 1980s that there remained a considerable degree of policy uncertainty so that expectations about …scal policy continued to play a key role; nervousness about this in ‡uenced the Thatcher government's policies to bring …scal de…cits down steadily so that in practice the role of …scal policy in the economy's behaviour was minimalised. In sum the evidence of these two decades of UK history suggest that …scal de…cits were key to the macro-economic crises of the 1970s and bringing them under control was important, alongside tighter monetary policy, in restoring stability in the 1980s.
AppendixA Derivation of Government Budget Constraint
The government budget constraint gives us Bt+1 Rt = G t T t + B t +
Bt Rt
Where, G t is the government spending in money terms, T t is the government taxation in money terms, R t is the amount of nominal interest the government must pay. The value of the bonds outstanding is B 1 R . We can derive an expression for government budget constraint in the forward direction by substituting forwards for future bonds outstanding, yields
We approximate this expression by
where t t ; g t ; t ; are the currently expected permanent values respectively of the tax/GDP and government spending/GDP ratios, the in ‡ation rate, and the growth rate (assumed constant at all times); P t ; y t are respectively the permanent price level and equilibrium output ) .
